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Abstract
It has been suggested (Morris, Shin 2001) that co-ordination fail-
ure between holders of debt can affect the price of debt. In essence,
fear of premature foreclosure by other debtors can lead to preemptive
action, affecting the value of debt. Using a continuous-time frame-
work related to a Merton (1974)-type structural model, this paper
demonstrates how such co-ordination failures can affect the prices of
corporate bonds. As it turns out, the resulting model is version of a
structural model that allows default before maturity, a model feature
that has proven to be popular with practitioners.
1 Introduction
Morris and Shin (2001) (cf. also Morris and Shin 2000) argue that co-
ordination failure among creditors can have an effect on the price of debt.
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The problem of co-ordination failure is akin to the problem faced by depos-
itors of a bank which is vulnerable to a run. Even if it is not efficient to
foreclose on a loan, e. g. when the debtor is fundamentally viable, fear that
other creditors may foreclose can lead to preemptive action and inefficient
foreclosure.
In general, co-ordination failures can arise among creditors in a context
where it is possible for individual creditors to improve their position vis-a-
vis the firm at the cost of other creditors (i.e. in a situation with strategic
complementarities between the different lenders). This is the case for example
if creditors can foreclose individually, leaving other creditors exposed to a
firm with lower liquidity, or for instance if some creditors will be able to grab
assets in the case of financial difficulties at the expense of other creditors.
For holders of bonds, it is not in general possible to foreclose on the loan
represented by their bond as and when they wish - i. e. it is not possible to
sell the bond back to the firm, and also it is not in general possible to grab
assets and net out claims. In most jurisdictions, separate deals of individual
bondholders with the firm to the detriment of other bondholders are expressly
forbidden, and the grabbing of assets is prohibited by bankruptcy codes. In
the US, for instance the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 specifies that holders of
public debt need to give unanimous consent before a firm can alter the prin-
cipal, interest or maturity of any part of its public debt, and requires that all
holders of the same class of debt receive the same treatment. Under Chapter
11, holders of a particular type of debt will receive the same treatment (cf.
e.g. Baird and Jackson 1990, Jackson 1986). The aim of these provisions
is of course precisely to mitigate co-ordination failures. The scope for co-
ordination failure to arise between holders of bonds themselves is therefore
limited, and the co-ordination failure argument is probably not applicable to
holders of corporate bonds directly (at least not for most jurisdictions with
a well-defined legal framework).
However, bonds are typically not the only form of debt for any particular
firm - in particular, almost all companies will depend on bank credit of some
form in a crucial way, even if they depend on markets to raise the bulk
of their funds. Firms that raise short term cash in the commercial paper
market, for instance, will almost always have commercial paper backup lines
of credit, to have an emergency supply of liquidity in situations where they
cannot raise money on the commercial paper markets (i. e. the kind of
situation we are interested in). Bank credit is almost always governed by
covenants which are meant to afford creditors a measure of protection, and
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give them the discretion to stop lending in some situations. This in fact
serves to create the strategic complementarities necessary for co-ordination
failure. Some recent examples have highlighted the role of bank credit and
covenants in financial distress, such as the demise of e. g. Vivendi, Kirch,
Enron, Energis, Worldcom and Hutchison 3G to name but a few of the more
high-profile cases.
For larger firms, any loan or line of credit is likely to be syndicated as
banks try to diversify their credit risks. Co-ordination failures and premature
inefficient foreclosure can arise between these banks. These co-ordination
failures will of course affect the price of bonds. It is in this setting that this
paper will model the effect of co-ordination failure on the price of bonds.
Morris and Shin (2001) model co-ordination failure as a function of a
fundamental variable, which can easily be interpreted as the asset value of a
firm. This naturally suggests using a structural model to price the bond: The
structural, or firm-value based approach pioneered by Merton (1974) explains
prices as a function of the process driving the asset value of a company: Bonds
are treated as a ‘bull spread’ on the asset value of a firm, and bankruptcy
occurs when the face value of debt exceeds the value of assets at some given
date.
Empirically, there is evidence that the simplest structural model (the orig-
inal (Merton 1974) model) seems to require implausibly high volatilities to
generate reasonable bond prices (cf. e.g. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld 1984,
Anderson and Sundaresan 2000, Eom, Helwege, and Huang 2001). Many
extensions have been proposed to make it more realistic: e. g. relating to
sub-ordination arrangements and indenture provisions (allowing for default
before maturity) (Black and Cox 1976), coupon bearing bonds (Geske 1977),
stochastic interest rates (Shimko, Tejima, and van Deventer 1993, Longstaff
and Schwartz 1995) or an optimally chosen capital structure (e. g. Leland
1994). Strategic issues have only more recently become the focus of at-
tention. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin
(1997) look at a game between creditors and shareholders who optimally
choose to default on payments, rather than on games between creditors,
such as co-ordination failure.
It is interesting to note that allowing default before maturity seems to
have been one of the most interesting extensions for commercial implementa-
tions of the Merton model so far, it is used e g. in the KMV EDFTM method-
ology (Crosbie and Bohn 2002) or in the CreditGradesTM model (Finger
et al. 2002). Of course, models with a default barrier make it possible for
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much lower volatilities to produce lower bond prices, given some suitable as-
sumptions about recovery fractions, overcoming some of the shortcomings of
the original simple (Merton 1974) model.
This paper will derive a continuous-time structural model of bond prices,
with the simplest possible assumptions, integrating co-ordination failure. It
will be shown that once limits are taken, the model resembles the Merton
model, but with a default barrier, allowing for default before maturity.
2 The model
2.1 Co-ordination failure among short term creditors
Shorter-term financing for firms that issue bonds can take many forms. As
these firms are mostly large and well-established corporations, short-term
financing is likely to be raised either in the form of commercial paper, sup-
plemented by a commercial paper back-up line of credit, or by a revolving
credit facility or line of credit syndicated or extended by more than one bank,
as lenders try to diversify credit risk exposure. Any facility or line of credit
will almost certainly be governed by covenants intended to protect the cred-
itors. These covenants can be related to e. g. revenues, cash flow etc, and
will allow the creditors to foreclose or stop lending in case they are breached.
Co-ordination failure in periods of financial difficulty for the firm could
be modelled as follows: A firm needs a certain amount of short-term liquidity
(as e. g. working capital, which is proportional to the total value of assets),
which it borrows regularly from a syndicate of banks. Assume that the
actual amount borrowed is negligible when compared to the total amount of
publicly traded debt (the bond).1 The borrowing facility has previously been
negotiated, and is governed by covenants.
Assume that the covenants specify a cash-flow or revenue target, and
that revenues or cash-flows are proportional to the total asset value of the
firm. Alternatively, assume that the covenant specifies a value of assets (a
net worth covenant). In all cases, we can model a breach of the covenant
as a fall of the asset value below a pre-specified level. If the covenants are
breached, it is up to individual banks to decide whether or not to extend
further credit. Assume that if a large enough proportion of the banks decide
1For a non-negligible amount of bank debt, the resulting pricing equations would have
to be slightly adjusted. The solution and pricing methodology would remain the same,
however.
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